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In this paper we describe the reaction of the firm on governmental policy.
We present a model in which the government influences the firm by announcing
a certain tax rate and the firms (represented by one) decide about whether
to invest its money or pay out dividend. We model the interactions between
the government and the firm as an open-loop game, in which different
solution concepts (Pareto, Stackelberg and Nash) are possible.
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1. Introduction:
A crucial question in economic theory is: "what exactly is the relationship
between macroeconomic variables such as employment, growth of production
etc., and the micro economic variables such as profit, investment, number of
workers, etc.". Formulated more specifically in terms of economic policy the
following question could be posed: how can the government by tax policy,
wage regulations or monetary measures influence the decisions of the
enterprise in such a way that the objectives of the national economy are
achieved. A first impulse in carrying out this kind of research was given by
Verheyen [10]. In this paper Verheyen described firm behaviour in national
economics by means of an optimal control model and analyzed consequences of
actions of governmental policy. Verheyen studied two kinds of economic
systems: a labour-managed and a market economy. In the first one the
government tries to influence the economy by means of monetary policy and in
the second one by means of wage policy. In contrast to that paper, we deal
with the above problem by using the technique of differential games and give
the government the possibility to influence the economy by tax policy.
In section 2 we introduce a simple model in which the government
maximizes its consumption and the firms (represented by one) want to pay
out a maximum of dividend to their shareholders. In spite of the simplicity
of the model. we are able to study some main issues of governmental policy.
Section 3 contains a brief discussion of some conceptual problems that arise
by using differential games, while in section 4 the open-loop solutions and
their economic interpretation are given. In section 5 we discuss what will
happen if we extend the model. Finally, in section 6 we make aome remarks
and suggestions for future research.-2-
2. The model:
2.1 The firms:
We assume that the firm behaves as if it maximizes the shareholder's value
of the firm. This value consists of the sum of the dividend stream over the




in which t - time
T - planning period
D(t) - dividend
(1)
Assume that the amount of capital goods could only be raised by investment
and there is no depreciation:
K(t) - I(t). (2)
in which K(t) - capital good stock
I(t) - investment
We also suppose that profit is a linear function of capital good stock:
o(t) - qx(t), (3)
in which 0(t): profit (before tax payment)
q : capital productivity
Assuming that profit after taxation could be used for investment or to pay
out dividend, we get the next relation:
0(t) - TX(t) - D(t) t I(t) (4),
in which TX(t) - tax payment
Furthermore, investment and dividend must be greater than zero:
D(t) ~ 0 (5)
I(t) ~ o (6)
2.2 The government:
Also for the government we make some extremely simple assumpties: all the
tax payments received will immediately be spent on government consumption
(,which is not productive). We may think that the government will spend its
money on building bridges and houses, hospital care and military forces. The
government is not able to spend more than it receives (i.e. no budgetary
deficit):
TX(t) - G(t) (7)~-3-
in which G(t) - government spendings





where U(G(t)) is the utility function for the government, which is defined
in terms of government consumption. In this section we assume that:
U(G(t)):-G(t), (9)
so the government has a linear utility function. Of course, other utility
functions are possible, but we have taken the linear one for simplicity. In




Furthermore we assume that the tax payments are restricted by:
~r10(t) ( TX(t) ~ T20(t),
where T1 and T2 are determined by social limits.
2.3 The total model:
We can easily rewrite the model as follows
-government
T















which can be controlled by the
(14)
In this model there are two control variables ul(t) and u2(t), one state
variable K(t) and two players which can control one variable. In this way we-4-
have derived the same mathematical model as Lancaster [2] , but we use it to
solve a total other economic problem.
In our model the government has to deal with the following
interesting dilemma: the government wishing to maximize its tax receipts
should choose the high rate, but if it chooses the high rate, then the firm
has less to invest and the future tax income may decrease. If it chooses the
' low rate it has less to spend at this moment, but perhaps more in the
future.
~. A differentisl game:
In the protilem we have described above, the government and the firm do not
have the same interests. But both players have a direct influence on the
state variable. We can say it is a dynamic game. In (12)-(14) we have
described the objectives, the dynamics and the admissible strategies of the
game. If we want to solve this game we have to make some assumptions about
the information structure (open-loop, feedback, closed-loop) and the
solution concept (Nash, Stackelberg and Pareto). It is also important in our
game that it has a non-zero property (the sum of all 'players'criteria is
not constant). Another important question is which solution concept we
choose. The Nash solution provides a reasonable noncooperative solution for
this game when neither government nor firm dominates the decision process.
But íf one of the players is in a position where he can impose his strategy
on the other player, then the relevant concept may be Stackelberg. There is
also a possibility that the government and firm work together and cooperate.
In that case we can use the Pareto solution concept. For the information
structure we can choose between several possibilities: the following three
are most commonly used:
ui- ui(K,K~,t) (closed-loop no memory) (15)
ui- ui(K,t) (feedback) (16)
ui- ui(K~,t) (open-loop) (1~)
For the model we have specified in (12)-(14) we refer to a series
of papers, which has been written about the Lancastermodel. Lancaster
derived the open-loop Nash-solution and concerning the Stackelberg open-loop
problem, solutions have been given by Pohjola [~]. Recently Basar et al. [2]-5-
have developed the Feedback-Nash and -Stackelberg solutions. Another
possibility is to introduce and model the threats and bargaining between
government and firm as in Pohjola [5].
4. The open-loop solution:
In this paper we only deal with the open-loop case. This is the case in
which each player has to stick to predetermined plan. In practice this is
only realistic, when there is a binding contract between the government and
the firm. In the Stackelberg game we assume that the government is the
leader.
table 1: The Nash-solution if
T2 ~ 2
----------------------------------------------------
~ t e[~.t) ~ t E[t.T]
----------------------------------------------------
ul(t) I T1 I ~2
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 0




D(t) I 0 ~ q(1-T2)K~
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Figure 1: Capital good stock by different solutions concepts (K2~2)-6-
table 2: The Nash-solution if
22 ( 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------









I T2 ~ ~2











I(t) ~ q(1-~rl)K(t) ~ q(1-~c2)K(t) ~ G
table 3: The Stackelberg-solution if T2 ) 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------
~ t E[o.t) ~ t E[t.t) ~ t E[t.T]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ul(t) ~ ~1 I ~1 I ~2





G(t) ~ qT1K(t) ~ 9T1K I q~2K
NNN
D(t) ~ ~ I 9(1-T1)K ~
NNN
q(1-22)K
I(t) ~ 9(1-tl)K(t) ~ 0 ~ 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
table 4: The Pareto-solution
----------------------------------------------------
I t E[~.tN) I t E[tN.T]
----------------------------------------------------
ul(t) I T1 I T 6[T1,T2]














,where t - T - 1
q(1-T2)~
ln(2t2)
t - t t
q(1-T2) '
~ 1-2T1
t - min{T,T -
q(t2-T1)}
.
t- min{T - Q , T- q(i-,~ )} ,
1
t~- T - q ,
0 '
K - K e
w 9(1-T1)t
w. q(1-T1)t q(1-Y1)(t-t)

















In the Nash solution the government starts to tax at a low rate
and the firm invests at its maximum rate. At a certain moment, t, the
shareholders do not want the firm to invest. They are more interested in
collecting dividend because the end of the planning horizon comes nearer. So
they decide to invest no more. The government immediately reacts by
introducing a high tax rate. Even if the government asks a low rate, the
firm will not invest. In spite of the fact that the government wants more
investment, it cannot force the firm to do so. In the situation where T2 ( 2
the firm is more interested in investment than the government. Before the
moment that the firm has stopped the government chooses the high rate.
If t2 ~ 2 , the Stackelberg solution is equal to the Nash solution
in that case. In the Stackelberg solution for the case that T2 ~ 2 the
firm's investment period is longer than in the Nash-solution (t ~ t). As-8-
compensation the government will postpone the application of the high rate.
So there is a period in which the firm pays out dividend and the government
asks a low rate. In a Nash game such a period could not exist. In a
Stackelberg game the government knows the reaction of the firm on every
possible strategy. It is easy to see that the leader of the game alsways
became better, when Stackelberg is played. In our situation both plsyers
become better when Stackelberg has been chosen. Moreover, if the government
had the possibility, at a moment between t and t, to make a new initial plan
the high rate is the plan, i.e. the open-loop solution is not time-
consistent.
It is also possible to derive the Pareto solution. In principle
there are many Pareto solutions (see Hcel [3]). But we are only interested
in what Lancaster called the social optimum. In that case the government and
the firm want to maximize the sum of government spendings and dividend. The
w
time t, when investment stops, is later than in a noncooperative game. So
there will be more capital in this economy. Also the value of both
~
objectives is greater than in a noncooperative case. After the time t we
can say nothing about the way that S(t) is divided between government
consumption and dividend. The Pareto solution will only give an answer to
the question what is the total of both.
5. A more sophisticated model:
In section 2 we have presented a very easy model. Admittedly, the economic
model has many unrealiatic features. However, it gives a fr.amework for an
analysis of governmental policy, although it could be generalized in several
ways. In this section we will change a number of assumptions in the basic
model and ask what will happen with the main conclusions. We make the model
of section 2 more realistic by incorporating the following extensions:
- a discount rate (5.1)
- a concave profit function (5.2)
- a salvage value for the firm at the end of the planning period (5.3)
- a logarithmic utility function (5.4)
- investment grants (5-5)-9-
- depreciation (5.6)
- unemployment payments (5.7)
We will compare the results with those of the basic model presented
in section 2. We are especially interested in the switching time t. when the
firm changes its policy and pays out dividend, and the final value of the
capital good stock. We confine our interest to the Nash game.
5.1 A discount rate:
Assume that the government discount the future at a rate i and the








K(t) - qK(t)(1-ul(t))u2(t) (29)
In appendix 1 we used Pontryagin's maximumprinciple to derive the solution
for this model. The switch from investment to dividend takes place at:




where we assume that iCq(1-T2). From (18) and (30) we can conclude that
there will be an earlier switch and therefore the final capital stock will
be less. In the case that i is close to zero (30) becomes
t - T - q(1-T2)' (31)
which is the same as in the basic model. As we did in section 4 we can
represent the solution in a table. However, nothing changes in table 1 and
2, except the criteria for the different solutions:
Table 1: the Nash-solution if
qi2(e-it- e-iT) ~ e-it
i -
Table 2: the Nash-solution if
qi2(e-it- e-iT) ~ e-it-10-
5.2 A concave profit function:
One of the strong assumptions of the basic model is that profit is a linear
function of capital. Zn this subsection we will assume that there is a
concave relation between profit 0(K) and the capital good stock:
2
áx ~ o, a o~ o. (3~)
dK







K(t) - 0(K(t))(1-ul(t))u2(t) (37)
In this situation the so-called reaction functions will not change (see
appendix 1). The introduction of this concave profit function has only
consequences for the development of the shadow prices of capital. For the
switching time we get the following expression:
t - T - 1 ~ ~
0 (K )(1-T2)~
w
where K is the final value of the capital good stock and
(38)
' ~ d0 ~
0(K )-~ K-K~. Before we can compare t snd K to the result of the
, ~ ~
basic model we have to say something about the value of 0(KO) and 0(K ).
There are five possible situations:-11-
table 5: comparison with basic model
I ~,(KO) ~ q I 0~(K~) - q I 0~(K~) ) q
0~(K~) ~ q I(t) - (KN) - I - - I - ?
In this table a"t" expresses that this variable is greater than the same
varíable in the basic model. Here we can use table 1 and 2 to describe the
way in which the economy develops.
5.3 A salvage value for the firm at the end of the planning period:
Also in this case nothing changes in the main conclusions. The paths we have
derived in tables 1 and 2 still apply. In this case the model becomes :
T
f qK(t)ul(t)dt t aK(T) (39)
0
T
f qK(t)(1-ul(t))(1-u2(t))dt } bK(T)
0
(40)
K(t) - qK(t)(1-ul(t))u2(t) (41)
It is realistic to assume that 0~ a~ 1 and 0~ b( 1. If, for example,
b- 1 then the firm does not pay out during the whole planning period. It
has a greater affinity to capital in the period [T,m) than in the period we
discuss. We can calculate the switching time as follows:
1 - b t - T -
q(1-T2) (42)
In the case that b is greater than zero the period of capital accumulation
will be greater. So there is more capital at the end of the period.-12-
5.4 A logarithmic utility function:
An interestinó case is the situation in which we incorporate in a
logarithmic utility function for the government. In that case the problem




The objective of the firm is unchanged.
For the tax policy of the government we can say:
(431
- if the firm does not invest the high tax rate will be asked
- if the firm invests the government asks the following rate:






fígure 2: tax-rate by logarithmic utility function
So there are three possible situations:-~3-
i) t C t( t if t2 ~ 2,. Yl 4 T2 ) 1 ( K~- KM)
ii) t~ ~ t( t'~ if T2 ~ 2~ Z1 t T2 ( 1( K~~ KN)
~ „
iii) t~ t C t if T2 ~ 2, ( K~C K~)
where K~ is the final value of capital good stock. Notice that the switching
time is exactly the same as in the basic model. In situation i) the
switching time lies before the time, that the government wants to change its
tax policy. In situations ii) and iii) there is a progressive move of i
until the moment that the firm pays out dividend or until the time that the
high rate has been reached. From above we can conclude that in situation ii)
and iii) the bang-bang structure of the tax policy (i.e. the tax rate jumps
at once from its lower- to its upperbound) disappears.
5.5 Investment grants:
What we can easily incorporate in our model are investment grants. We model
investment grants as follows: the government has the possibility to pay back
to the firm a certain amount of the tax payments, if it continues
investment:
TX(t) - G(t) f u3(t)In(t), (44)
in which In(t) - investment financed by the firm
u3(t)In(t) - investment financed by the government
u3(t) - investment grants rate
The state-equation becomes:
K(t) - I(t) - In(t)(1tu3Ít))
- qK(t)(1-ul(t))u2(t)(1}u3(t)) (45)
The objectives get the following form:
T






The government has two control variables. For u3(t) - 0, 0( t C T, we have
the basic model. We assume for u3: 0( u3 C g
It is realistic to assume that ~
~ T1 ~ i2
~ 1 ~ 0
I g I o
(48)
(49)
because then it always hold that ul-u3(1-ul)u2)0, which implies that there
is no budgetary deficit.
Also now we have two situations:
2t - 1
table 6: The Nash-solution if T2 ) 2 and g C 1-~
2








table 7: The Nash-solution if (T2 ~ 2 and g ~ 1-T ) or
i2~ 2
- 2 -
~ t e[O,t) ~ t E[t,t) ~ t e[t,T]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ul(t) ~ T1 ~ T2 ~~2
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 0
u3(t) ~ B ~ B ~ ~
q(1-T )(ife)t q(1-T )(itg)(t-t) ..
K(t) ~KOe 1 ~K(t)e 2 ~ K
q(1-il)(l;B)t
----------------------------------------------------------------------------15-
, with K - KOe
-" q(1-T1)(ltg)t
.. q(i-T1)(l~g)t q(1-~2)(ltg)(t-t)
K - KOe e
In this case with investment grants the firm will go on longer with
investment:t - T - 1 (50)
9(1-T2)(lfg)
So the final value of capital good stock will be greater. Also the optimal
payoff to both players will be greater.
5.6 Depreciation of capital good stock:
If we incorporate depreciation capital good stock will increase by:
K(t) - I(t) - aK(t), (51)
in which e:depreciation rate. Following Van Loon [6], we write down the








S - qK I
TX
D
In which X: equity
S: earnings-16-









K(t) - qK(t)(1-ul(t))u2(t) - aK(t). (54)
where we assume that q(1-T2) ) a. This is also a very interesting case
because there are two different switching times (from investment to
dividend). The switching time is dependent on the fiscal regime at that
moment:
t - T - 1
q(1-T2)(1
-
1~T1 q) lf 1-T2(1 -
~1 a
1-T1 q) ) 1 (i) (55)
t- T- q(11~2)(1 - 1T~2 q) if 1~~2(1 - 1~~1 q) ~ 1 (ii) (56)
For the paths we have two possible situations:
table 8: The Nash-solution (i)







K(t) ~ K~e ~ K(t)e-17-
table 9: The Nash-solution (ii)
---------------------------------------------------------------------










(q(1-T )-a)t - (q(1-T )-g)(t-t) - s(t - t)
K(t) ~K~e 1 ~K(t)e 2 ~ K(t)e
(q(1-~rl)-a)t




K(t) - K~e e
In both situations there will be a later switch. Notice that in this case no
stationary stage of capital good stock arisea (it would arise again when we
combine depreciation with a final value of the firm). The value of capital
good stock will have a lower vslue at each point of time and that of the
basic model.
5.8 Unemployment paynents:
Until now we have said nothing about labour. We cannot conclude that the
firm does not need labour for production. If we assume that there is a
Leontief technology and capital is the most restricted factor, we get:
X- min(q'K,q~~L) - q'K ( see Varian [9~ PaBe 5). (57)
.. .
where q ~q :slope of the Leontief technology. At this level of capital good









Figure 3: Isoquants of a Leontief technology
In that case is 0(t) - pX(t) - wL(t)
- (Pq - w-~; )K(t)
9
- qK(t) . (58)
in which w is waQe. This is the same expression as (3).
The situation will change if we introduce unemployment payments.
Let L~ denote the supply of labour. So the unemployment will be:
a
L - L - L
u (59)
The government has to ps,y w Lu (-U) (, where w~w) for unemployment payments
and there remains G- T- w Lu for government spendings. G is greater than
zero if
~ w ~ ,~
w (L - (q ~q )K4)
qK0
(60)
It is quite reasonable that in these situation the government has a greater
impulse for capital accumulation and there may be a longer period of a low
tax rate.-19-
~[2q t w ~
table 10: The Nach-solution if q(1-,~ )~ 1.
2










w1 (-g„K(t) - L~)
q
G(t) ~(qTl - w~~)K(t) t
9











w (~K - L )
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~ x M





~ t E[O~t) ~ t e[t.t) ~ t e[t~T]
ul(t) ~ T1 ~ T2 ~~2








~ M ~ M ~ NN N
U(t) ~ w'(~K(t) - L) ~ w~(~;K(t) - L ) ~ w1(~K - L)
9 4 q
r ~ xw
~ ~ N ~ ~ M ~





t will be on a later point of time than in the basic model.-20-
5.8 Summary:
We can summarize sections 5.1 through 5.7 in the following table, where
t- switching time from investment to dividend
:
K- final value of capital good stock at t-T
table 12: t
5.1 a discountin~ rate -
5.2 concave earninss function ?
5-3 a endvalue t
5.4 a log. utility function 0
5.5 investments arantr t
5.6 depreciation t








In this table a"t" e~cpresses that this variable is greater than the same
variable in the basic model.
6. Conclusions:
In the previous sections we have described in what way the government can
influence the ;rowth of the economy. A general conclusion is that a
government, which spends a lot and needs a lot of tax payments, will have a
negative influence on the trowth of the economy. This is one of the things
we see today in western society. Of course this conclusion is only realistic
in the framework of the model, but we believe it has its impact on modern
society. From this we cannot conclude that the situation of less government
spendings is better. Perhaps in terms of welfare it would be better to have
more government spendings and less capital accumulation. This is a political
choice.
In the basic model we have shown the difference between the Nash-
and Stackelberg solutions. In the Stackelberg game, where the government has
insight in the way the firm will react to every possible strategy, both
players are better off. For the government it is important to know how the
firm will react. We have not derived the Stackelberg solutions of the models
described in section 5. Since these soltions ínvolve some serious analytical-21-
problems. This is a topic of future research. We have only studied the open-
loop information structure in this paper. More general patterns, i.e.
closed-loop strategies with memory and feedback, are more desirable. because
they are time consiatent. This is also a topic of future research.
The model, we have presented, even with the extensions has still
many unrealistic features. For example we could replace the fixed-
coefficient production function by a neoclassical one. In that case the firm
has the possibility to choose the production technique. For the government
we can build in more instruments, such as wage control. We believe,
certainly for the Dutch cese. that the government in practice does not have
a great influence on the real wages. In this paper we have assumed that
government consumption is not productive. In practice some government
spendings (like those for a new electricity plant) will raise the
investment. Of course, society is more complex than we described. In spite
of this we believe that dynamic game theory is a fruitful way to model the
interaction between government and firm. Both have their own interests and
their own controls, and neither of them can force the other to do exactly
what he wants.-22-
Appendix 1: the derivation of the Nash-solution in section 5:
The necessary conditions for a Nash-solution are (see Basar~Olsder [1]):
H1lK(t). ul(t), u2(t), A1(t). t) ) H1(K(t), u1(t). u2(t). ~1(t). t),
v uie U1(-[T1.T2]) (0.1)
H2(K(t), ui(t), u2(t), a2(t), t) ) H2(K(t), ul(t), u2(t), A2(t), t),
v u2e U2(-[0,1]) (0.2)
~H
~1(t) - ~K1 (0.3)
~H




K(t) - f(K(t),u1(t),u2(t),t) (0.8)
For the basic model (12)-(14) (0.1),...(0.8) can be written as:
H1 - qKul t ~iqK(1-u1)u2 (1.1)
H2 - qK(1-ul)(1-u2) t A2qK(1-u1)u2 (1.2)
~1- -qul - A19(1-ul)u2




K - qK(1-u1)u2 (1.7)
K(0)-K0 (1.8)
(1.1),(1.2) together with (0.1),(0.2) gives us the so-called reaction
functions:
player one: u1- T2 if 1-alu2)0 (1.9)-23-
u1- T1 if 1-alu2~o
player two: u2- 1 if ~2~1
u2- 0 if ~2~1
These conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient because of the
fact that the Hamiltonian is linear in the state variable.
Using (1.1) through (1.12) we can easily calculate the optimal solution. For
each of the models presented we will write down the optimal conditions (1.1)





H2 - qK(1-ul)(1-u2)e-~t t ~2qK(1-ul)u2
~1- -qule-it - ~19(1-ul)u2
~2- -q(1-ul)(1-u2)e-~t - ~2q(1-ul)u2
The reaction function:
player one: u1- ~r2 if e-lt-~lu2 ) 0
u1- tl if e-it-~iu2 ( 0
player two: u2- 1 if ~2 ~ e
-jt




When a2 will fall below e-~t, u2 will become zero and ul T2 (if not
already).
In that case: ~2- -q(1-i2)e-~t ~ ~2(t) - (q(1-i2)~J)(e-~t-e-~T). t ~ t
So because ~2(t) - 1 ~ 1 - (q(1-T2)~j)(e-~t-e-~T)
~ t - T t (lI~)ln(1 -
q(1-~r2))-24-






1 ~ 1 ~ 0
sit. I if ~2(t) ~ 1~(qT2)~~)(e-~t-e-~T) ~ e-~t
sit. II if ~2(t) ~ 1 ~ (qi2)~j)(e-~t-e-~T)
-section 5.2:
H1 - 0(K)ul t ~10(K)(1-ul)u2
H2 - 0(K)(1-ul)(1-u2) } a20(K)(1-ul)u2
~1- -d~K 1 - ~1~(1-ul)u2






H1 - lnq t 1nK t lnul t~iqK(1-ul)u2
~1- -K - ~1q(1-ul)u2
Let yl- ~1K then we can write the reaction function as follows:
player one- u1- T2 if yl~ qT or u2- 0
- 2
1 1 1











u1- ~1 if yl~ q,i-~ (5-9c)
1-25-
-section 5.5:
H1 - qK(ul-u3(1-ul)u2) 4 a1qK(1-ul)u2(ltu3)
H2 - qK(1-ul)(1-u2) f ~2qK(1-ul)u2(1'u3)
~1- -q(ul-u3(1-ul)u2) - ~lq(1-ul)u2(ltu3)















u3- S if ~1) 0
u3- 0 if ~1( 0
player two- u2- 1 if ~2 ~ 1
} "3
u2- 0 if ~2 ~ 1 t u3
-section 5.6:
H1 - (q-s)Kul } ~1(qK(1-ul)u2-aK)
H2 - qK(1-ul)(1-u2) t u1aK t~2(qK(1-ul)u2-aK)
~1- -(q-a)ul - ~1(q(1-ul)u2-a)
a2- -q(1-ul)(1-u2) - ula - a2(q(1-ul)u2-a)
K - qK(1-ul)u2-aK
The reaction functions are:
ula
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